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Follow the chain of trust from the root down to your zone.
Hands off to the full WebShield scanner, which covers this check alongside every other header, DNS and email auth probe.
DNSSEC turns DNS from 'whatever the resolver told me' into 'signed by a chain of trust rooted at the KSK at IANA.' When it works, cache-poisoning is dead and your DS records at the parent prove your zone's keys. When it breaks, validating resolvers return SERVFAIL and users see 'This site can't be reached.' WebShield walks the whole chain, flags each link's status and gives you a fix for the one that's wrong.
Unsigned DNS is still plaintext - a resolver-path adversary can forge answers and redirect traffic. DNSSEC closes that. It's also a hard prerequisite for several adjacent protocols (DANE for SMTP, SSHFP for SSH host keys, TLSA for any DNS-pinned TLS cert). Getting it right once means cache-poisoning attacks against your domain become implausible.
The scanner performs iterative DNSSEC validation: fetches DS from the parent, resolves DNSKEY at the zone, matches the DS digest to a DNSKEY, verifies RRSIG over the DNSKEY set, then verifies RRSIG over any queried records. Expired or not-yet-valid signatures are flagged. NSEC/NSEC3 proofs of non-existence are validated where applicable.
1. Dashboard → DNS → Settings → DNSSEC → Enable
2. Cloudflare shows you a DS record
3. Copy the DS record (algorithm, key tag, digest type, digest)
4. Paste it at your registrar's parent-zone DNSSEC form
5. Wait for the parent to publish; validation starts within minutes to an hour1. Route 53 → Hosted zones → your zone → DNSSEC signing → Enable
2. AWS creates a KMS-backed KSK
3. "View information to create DS record" → copy the DS record
4. Paste at your registrar's DNSSEC form
5. Route 53 now signs every change automaticallyzone "example.com" {
type master;
file "/var/named/example.com.zone";
dnssec-policy default; # modern BIND handles key rollover
inline-signing yes;
};pdnsutil secure-zone example.com
pdnsutil set-meta example.com SOA-EDIT-DNSSEC default
pdnsutil export-zone-ds example.com
# copy the DS line to your registrarAlmost always: DS at the parent does not match any DNSKEY at the zone (common after a key rollover that did not update the registrar), or RRSIGs have expired (signer offline too long). Re-sync DS at the registrar or re-sign the zone.
No - they solve different problems. DoH and DoT encrypt the DNS transport between your resolver and a server. DNSSEC authenticates the DNS answer regardless of transport. They compose: DoH means the ISP can't see the queries; DNSSEC means the answer can't be forged.
ECDSA P-256 (algorithm 13) is the modern baseline - small signatures, universal validator support. Ed25519 (algorithm 15) is even smaller, supported by recent resolvers. Avoid RSA-SHA1 (5) and NSEC3-RSA-SHA1 (7) - both deprecated.
Not meaningfully. Signatures add a few hundred bytes per response, which matters only on slow links. Resolver caching absorbs most of the cost. ECDSA P-256 and Ed25519 signatures are small enough to fit in a single UDP response in most cases.